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Schumpeterian Creative Class Competition, Innovation 
Policy, and Regional Economic Growth  
Abstract 
 We focus on a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. The creative class is 
broadly composed of existing and candidate entrepreneurs. The general question we analyze 
concerns the effects of Schumpeterian competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs 
on economic growth and innovation policy in this region. We perform four specific tasks. First, 
when the flow rate of innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs is strictly concave, we 
delineate the circumstances in which competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs 
leads to a unique balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Second, we examine whether it is 
possible for the BGP equilibrium to involve different levels of R&D expenditures by the existing 
entrepreneurs. Third, we show how the BGP equilibrium is altered when the flow rate of 
innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs is constant. Finally, we study the impact that 
taxes and subsidies on R&D by existing and candidate entrepreneurs have on R&D expenditures 
and regional economic growth.  
Keywords: Creative Class, Creative Destruction, Economic Growth, Innovation Policy, R&D 
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1. Introduction 
 Regional scientists and urban economists are now very familiar with the twin notions of 
the creative class and creative capital. This is because of the considerable impact that Richard 
Florida’s two tomes The Rise of the Creative Class in 2002 and the Flight of the Creative Class 
in 2005 have had on both academic researchers and policymakers in regions throughout the 
United States and Western Europe.4 Florida (2002, p. 68) helpfully explains that the creative 
class “consists of people who add economic value through their creativity.” This class is 
composed of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, university professors, 
and, notably, bohemians such as artists, musicians, and sculptors. From the perspective of 
regional economic growth and development, these people are important because they possess 
creative capital which is the “intrinsically human ability to create new ideas, new technologies, 
new business models, new cultural forms, and whole new industries that really [matter]” 
(Florida, 2005a, p. 32). 
The creative class deserves to be studied in detail, says Florida, because this group of 
people gives rise to ideas, information, and technology, outputs that are significant for the 
growth and development of cities and regions. Therefore, in this era of globalization, regions that 
want to be successful need to do all they can to attract and retain members of the creative class 
because this class is the primary driver of regional economic growth. 
Several researchers have now documented the salience of the creative class in promoting 
regional economic growth and development. For instance, in a theoretical paper, Batabyal and 
Nijkamp (2013) show how the preferences of the creative class affect the properties of the so 
called constant growth path (CGP) equilibrium in an urban economy. Gabe et al. (2013) use 
                                                            
4  
Also see Florida (2005b, 2014) and Florida et al. (2008). 
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individual-level data from the United States (US) Current Population Surveys and show that in 
the 2006-2011 time period, relative to other workers, members of the creative class had a lower 
probability of being unemployed and that the benefit of being employed in a creative occupation 
rose over time.  
Currid-Halkett and Stolarick (2013) complement the first finding in Gabe et al. (2013) 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Specifically, these researchers look at regional 
unemployment variation in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and show that 
members of the creative class have a lower likelihood of being unemployed. From this result, 
these researchers conclude that although creativity definitely influences economic performance, 
the magnitude of this influence depends on the size of a region. Tiruneh (2014) uses Italian data 
and demonstrates that along with technology, the creative class in a region has a positive impact 
on this region’s economic development. 
Concentrating on Nordic nations, Tohmo (2015) points out that there is a clear positive 
association between the existing creative class in these nations and the birth rate of high-
technology firms. Finally, in a paper that has both theoretical and empirical foci, Buettner and 
Janeba (2016) contend that in some settings, German cities face strong incentives to attract 
members of the creative class by providing these members with the appropriate amenities.  
Given this review of the literature, it is now essential to emphasize three points. First, the 
above studies and the work of Eversole (2005), Baumol (2010), Siemiatycki (2013), and 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014) tells us that in regions where the creative class is a dominant part 
of the overall workforce, there is a clear link between innovations, the creative class, and 
regional economic growth and development. Second, innovative activities and processes are 
essentially competitive in nature and it is this competitive aspect that is related to the insight of 
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Joseph Schumpeter who argued that growth processes are marked by creative destruction in 
which “economic growth is driven, at least in part, by new firms replacing incumbents and new 
machines and products replacing old ones” (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 458). Finally, the preceding two 
points notwithstanding, there are no theoretical studies that analyze how Schumpeterian 
competition between the members of a region’s creative class affects either innovation policy or 
economic growth in this region.5 Hence, in this paper, we provide the first theoretical analysis of 
the ways in which Schumpeterian creative class competition influences both innovation policy 
and economic growth in a region that is creative a la Richard Florida.6 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical 
model of a creative region that is adapted from Acemoglu (2009, pp. 472-479) and Acemoglu 
and Cao (2015). The creative class in this region is broadly composed of existing and candidate 
entrepreneurs. The key question we analyze concerns the effects of Schumpeterian competition 
between existing and candidate entrepreneurs for innovation policy and economic growth in this 
region. The engine of economic growth in our creative region is process innovations that lead to 
quality improvements in the inputs or machines that are used to produce a knowledge good such 
as a smartphone that is also the final consumption good. On the assumption that the flow rate of 
innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs is strictly concave, section 3 describes the 
                                                            
5  
The Schumpeterian competition we study is described in detail in section 2 below. Also, note that we are aware of three 
theoretical papers that study Schumpeterian economic growth in one or more regions. Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014) have used a 
Schumpeterian growth model to study the circumstances in which there is either too much or too little innovation first in a 
generic region and then when this region is part of an aggregate economy of ܰ ൒ 2 regions. Batabyal and Beladi (2016) have 
analyzed the effects of probabilistic innovations on Schumpeterian economic growth in a creative region. This paper also studies 
whether there is too much or too little innovation in this same creative region. Batabyal and Yoo (2017) analyze the nature of 
R&D per se and the Schumpeterian economic growth that the conduct of R&D gives rise to in a creative region. Although there 
is some similarity between the models employed in these three papers and the model employed in our paper, we stress that there 
is no overlap between the questions analyzed in the above three papers and the issues we study in the present paper. 
6  
The existence of this kind of competition in real world settings has been noted by several writers. For instance, if we think of 
“Silicon Valley” in California as our creative region and individuals who are programmers or computer engineers or applications 
developers as members of the creative class in this region then the work of Miller and Wortham (2011), Terdiman (2014), and 
Widdicombe (2014) tells us that there is fierce competition not only between these individuals but also, more generally, for their 
talents by headhunters and final good producers.  
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circumstances in which competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs in the creative 
class leads to a unique balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Section 4 examines whether it 
is possible for the BGP equilibrium to involve different levels of research and development 
(R&D) expenditures by the existing entrepreneurs with machines of dissimilar qualities.7 Section 
5 shows how the BGP equilibrium is altered when the flow rate of innovation function for the 
existing entrepreneurs is constant. Section 6 studies the effect that taxes and subsidies on R&D 
by existing and candidate entrepreneurs have on R&D expenditures and regional economic 
growth. Finally, section 7 concludes and then offers two suggestions for extending the research 
delineated in this paper. 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Preliminaries 
 Consider an infinite horizon, stylized region that is creative in the sense of Richard 
Florida. Time is continuous. The representative creative class household in this region displays 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and its CRRA utility function is denoted by 
׬ expሺെߩݐሻ ሾሼܥሺݐሻଵିఏஶ଴ -1}/(1-ߠሻሿ݀ݐ, ߠ ് 1, where ܥሺݐሻ is consumption at time ݐ, ߩ ൐ 0 is the 
constant time discount rate, and ߠ ൒ 0 is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion.8 At 
any time ݐ, members of the creative class in the region under study possess creative capital and 
we denote each member and his creative capital by ܴሺݐሻ. The population of the creative class is 
constant and therefore we have ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ܴ, ∀ݐ. The available creative capital is supplied 
inelastically.  
 The aggregate resource or budget constraint in our creative region at time ݐ is given by 
                                                            
7  
See Orman (2015) and Chen et al. (2017) for alternate perspectives on innovation and R&D. 
8  
See Acemoglu (2009, pp. 308-309) for additional details on the properties of the CRRA utility function. 
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ܥሺݐሻ ൅ ܺሺݐሻ ൅ ܫሺݐሻ ൑ ܱሺݐሻ      (1) 
where ܥሺݐሻ is consumption, ܺሺݐሻ is total spending on machines, ܫሺݐሻ is total spending on R&D, 
and ܱሺݐሻ is the output of the single final good for consumption that we shall think of as a 
knowledge good such as a smartphone. The price of this final good is normalized to unity at all 
points in time and therefore ܱሺݐሻ denotes both the output and the value of the final good. The 
reader should note that the machines we have just referred to can also be thought of as inputs or 
intermediate goods. 
 There is a continuum of machines that is used to produce the single final good ܱሺݐሻ. Each 
machine line or variety9 is described by ߥ where ߥ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. As noted in the last paragraph of 
section 1, the source of economic growth in our creative region is process innovations that 
improve the quality of existing machines. To this end, let ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ denote the quality of the 
machine of line ߥ at time ݐ.  
 The single final good for consumption (the knowledge good) in our creative region or 
ܱሺݐሻ is produced in accordance with the function  
 
ܱሺݐሻ ൌ ଵଵିఉ ሾ׬ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻఉݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻଵିఉ
ଵ
଴ ݀ߥሿܴఉ,    (2) 
 
where ܴ is the creative capital input, ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ is the quality of the machine of line ߥ at time ݐ, 
ݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ is the total amount of the machine of variety ߥ and quality ݍ that is used at time ݐ, and 
ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is a parameter of the production function. Let ݓ ൐ 0 denote the wage rate or the return 
to the creative capital input ܴ and let ݎ ൐ 0 denote the interest rate.  
                                                            
9  
We shall use the words “line” and “variety” interchangeably in the remainder of this paper. 
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 The quality improvements in the inputs or machines that arise from the process 
innovations mentioned above are the result of two types of innovations. The first type of 
innovation is performed by members of the creative class who we refer to as existing 
entrepreneurs. These are the individuals who have already invented and produced machines that 
are presently being used to produce the final consumption good. The second type of innovation is 
performed by the members of the creative class who we call candidate entrepreneurs. These are 
the individuals who are seeking to invent and produce higher qualities of machine lines than the 
ones that are presently being used to produce the final consumption good. The central feature of 
the model we employ in this paper is the Schumpeterian competition between existing and 
candidate entrepreneurs in the creative class. This competition is Schumpeterian because for any 
machine line ߥ, when a candidate entrepreneur develops a machine of higher quality than the 
quality that is presently in use to produce the final consumption good, the candidate 
entrepreneur’s higher quality machine creatively destroys an existing entrepreneur’s now lower 
quality machine. Next, let us comprehend the R&D process that gives rise to the production of 
higher quality machines.  
2.2. The invention and production of quality machines 
 Let ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ denote the quality of machine line ߥ at time ݐ. The “quality ladder” for each 
machine variety is of the form 
ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ ൌ ߜ௡ݍሺߥ, ݏሻ, ∀ߥ	ܽ݊݀	ݐ,     (3) 
where ߜ ൐ 1 can be thought of as the “ladder” with rungs and ݊ denotes the number of marginal 
innovations on this machine line---or the number of rungs climbed up the ladder---in the time 
period between ݏ ൑ ݐ and ݐ. Here, ݏ is the time at which this particular type of machine 
technology was first invented and ݍሺߥ, ݏሻ is its quality at that point in time. An existing 
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entrepreneur has a fully enforced patent on the machines that he has developed. However, this 
patent leaves open the possibility that a candidate entrepreneur will engage in R&D and thereby 
“jump over” an existing entrepreneur’s machine quality. At time ݐ ൌ 0, each machine line begins 
with some quality ݍሺߥ, 0ሻ ൐ 0 and this line is owned by an existing entrepreneur. We suppose 
that marginal innovations can only be brought about by an existing entrepreneur. In this regard, 
if an existing entrepreneur engages in R&D and spends an amount ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻݍሺߥ, ݐሻ of the final 
consumption good for a marginal innovation on a machine of quality ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ then this existing 
entrepreneur generates a flow rate of innovation given by ߶ሺ݅ாሻ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ where ߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൐
0, 	߶ᇱᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൏ 0 and this flow rate function ߶ሺ∙ሻ satisfies the (Inada like) conditions 
݈݅݉௜ಶ→଴߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൌ ∞ and ݈݅݉௜ಶ→ஶ߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൌ 0. The result of this R&D and expenditure by an 
existing entrepreneur is a new machine of quality ߜݍሺߥ, ݐሻ.  
 Candidate entrepreneurs can also engage in R&D with the aim of producing quality 
machines that will improve upon or jump over the presently used machines of line ߥ at time ݐ. 
Suppose that the current quality of a machine of line ߥ is ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ. Then, by spending one unit of 
the final consumption good, a candidate entrepreneur can innovate at the flow rate 
ߟሼ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ⁄  where ߟᇱሼ∙ሽ ൏ 0 and ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻ denotes the R&D expenditure incurred by the 
candidate entrepreneur on machine line ߥ at time ݐ. For machine line ߥ, we refer to a quality 
innovation by a candidate entrepreneur that successfully jumps over an existing quality as a 
drastic innovation and a drastic quality innovation creatively destroys the existing quality 
machine of line ߥ. Note that whereas candidate entrepreneurs give rise to drastic innovations 
only, existing entrepreneurs can give rise to both marginal and drastic innovations. However, 
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even though existing entrepreneurs can give rise to both kinds of innovation, in practice, they 
only generate marginal innovations.10  
 The fact that the ߟሼ∙ሽ function described above is strictly decreasing captures the idea that 
when many candidate entrepreneurs are competitively engaging in R&D to try to creatively 
destroy the same machine line, there is likely to exist some diminishing returns. Also, given the 
competitive nature of the interactions between the different candidate entrepreneurs, each one of 
them is likely to be a “small player.” We model this feature of the problem by supposing that the 
candidate entrepreneurs treat the ߟሼ∙ሽ function as exogenous to their individual actions. Like we 
did for the flow rate function ߶ሺ∙ሻ for the existing entrepreneurs, we assume that the ߟሼ∙ሽ 
function for the candidate entrepreneurs also satisfies the (Inada like) conditions 
݈݅݉௜಴→ஶߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ 0 and ݈݅݉௜಴→଴ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ∞. Finally, a quality innovation by a candidate 
entrepreneur leads to a new machine of quality ߯ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ where ߯ ൐ ߜ. In other words, quality 
innovations by candidate entrepreneurs are more drastic than those undertaken by the existing 
entrepreneurs. 
 Once a specific machine of quality ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ has been invented, any amount of this machine 
can be produced at the marginal cost ߰ in terms of the final consumption good and, in what 
follows, to simplify some of the mathematics, we shall utilize the normalization ߰ ൌ 1 െ ߚ. Note 
that the total spending on R&D or ܫሺݐሻ in equation (1) can also be expressed as  
ܫሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ሼ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ ൅ ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽݍሺߥ, ݐሻ݀ߥଵ଴ ,    (4) 
                                                            
10  
This is because of Arrow’s (1962) replacement effect. Because of the fully enforced patent discussed in the preceding paragraph, 
an existing entrepreneur is a monopolist over his machine lines that are currently in use to produce the final consumption good. 
Therefore, with a drastic innovation, the new quality innovation would jump over an existing quality machine and the existing 
entrepreneur would, in effect, be replacing himself. This means that an existing entrepreneur has little incentive to generate 
drastic innovations and hence such an entrepreneur gives rise to marginal innovations only. In contrast, the market for generating 
drastic innovations on the part of candidate entrepreneurs is competitive because there is free entry. As such, even with drastic 
innovations, candidate entrepreneurs make zero profit. For additional details on these points, see Acemoglu (2009, pp. 420-422) 
and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014, pp. 610-611).  
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where ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ refers to the highest quality of machine variety ߥ at time ݐ.  
 In the economy of the creative region under study, an allocation has four parts to it. First, 
there are the trajectories of consumption, total spending on machines, and total spending on 
R&D given by ሼܥሺݐሻ, ܺሺݐሻ, ܫሺݐሻሽ௧ୀ଴ஶ . Second, we have the trajectories of the R&D expenditures 
undertaken by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs denoted by 
ሼ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ, ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽఔ∈ሾ଴,ଵሿ,௧ୀ଴ஶ . Third, there are the prices and the quantities of the highest quality 
machines and the net present discounted value of profits from these same machines given by 
ሼ݌௫ሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ, ݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ, ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻሽఔ∈ሾ଴,ଵሿ,௧ୀ଴ஶ . Finally, there are the trajectories of the interest and 
the wage rates denoted by ሼݎሺݐሻ, ݓሺݐሻሽ௧ୀ଴ஶ .  
An equilibrium allocation is one in which four properties are satisfied simultaneously. 
First, the candidate entrepreneurs make R&D decisions to maximize their present discounted 
value. Second, the existing entrepreneurs select machine prices and the quantities and make 
R&D decisions to maximize their present discounted value. Third, the representative creative 
class household chooses consumption to maximize its utility. Finally, all markets clear. It is 
understood that a BGP is an equilibrium trajectory on which both consumption and the output of 
the final consumption good grow at a constant rate. 
Now, with this theoretical framework in place, our next task is to delineate the 
circumstances in which competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs in the creative 
class leads to a unique balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. While undertaking this 
exercise, we shall adapt some of the results in Peters and Simsek (2009, pp. 275-284) to our 
analysis of Schumpeterian competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs in a 
creative region. 
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3. The BGP Equilibrium with Creative Class Competition 
3.1. Existence 
To derive the BGP equilibrium, it will be necessary to make two assumptions about the 
value function ܸሺ∙ሻ. First, we suppose that this function is independent of whether the underlying 
value is derived from the activities of the existing or the candidate entrepreneurs. Second, we 
suppose that this value function is linear in the quality argument and hence we have ܸሺݍሻ ൌ ߱ݍ. 
Modifying equations (8) and (9) in Acemoglu and Cao (2015, p. 262) to our case, we infer that 
the demand for the highest quality machine of line ߥ and the monopoly profits of existing 
entrepreneurs are given by  
ݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ݍܴ       (5) 
and 
ߨሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ߚݍܴ,       (6) 
where we have suppressed the dependence of quality ݍ on the machine line ߥ and time ݐ because 
this dependence does not arise once the current quality has been controlled for. The value to an 
existing entrepreneur from being a monopolist or the holder of a fully enforced patent can be 
written in terms of the value function ܸሺ∙ሻ. This value function satisfies the so called Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation given by 
ݎሺݐሻܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ െ ሶܸ ሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ߨሺ∙ሻ ൅ ݉ܽݔ௜ಶሼ߶ሺ݅ாሻܸሺߥ, ݐ; 	ߜݍሻ െ ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ െ ݅ாݍሽ െ
݅஼ߟሺ݅஼ሻܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ,          (7) 
where the dot on the ܸሺ∙ሻ function denotes a time derivative. It should be noted that the existing 
entrepreneurs take the R&D expenditures ݅஼ of the candidate entrepreneurs in equation (7) as 
given. 
13 
 
 To determine the optimal level of R&D expenditures or ݅ா∗, the existing entrepreneurs 
solve a maximization problem. As such, the optimal level ݅ா∗ can be written as 
݅ா∗ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௜ಶሼ߶ሺ݅ாሻܸሺߥ, ݐ; ߜݍሻ െ ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ െ ݅ாݍሽ.   (8) 
Now let us focus on the R&D choices of the candidate entrepreneurs or ݅஼ in the equilibrium of 
interest. In an interior equilibrium, we will have ݅஼ ൐ 0 and this means that the free entry 
condition for the candidate entrepreneurs must hold with equality. This free entry condition is 
ߟሼ݅஼ሽܸሺߥ, ݐ; 	߯ݍሻ ൌ ݍ.      (9) 
Equation (9) tells us that spending an amount ݍ gives rise to a flow rate of innovation ߟሼ݅஼ሽ and 
this innovation raises the present quality of machine line ߥ to ߯ݍ.  
 Using our independence and linear functional form assumptions for the value function 
ܸሺ∙ሻ, we get ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ܸሺݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ߱ሺݐሻݍ. We shall soon demonstrate that ߱ሺݐሻ is constant. 
Now, observe that equation (8) implies that 
݅ா∗ሺݐሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௜ಶሼ߶ሺ݅ாሻሺߜ െ 1ሻ߱ሺݐሻ െ ݅ாሽ.   (10) 
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to ݅ா, the first order necessary condition (FONC) for 
an optimum is 
߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሺݐሻሻሺߜ െ 1ሻ߱ሺݐሻ ൌ 1.      (11) 
Because the ߶ሺ∙ሻ function is strictly concave, the FONC in equation (11) above is also sufficient 
for an optimum.  
 Let us temporarily suppose that a BGP equilibrium exists. Then we know that along this 
BGP, the interest rate ݎ is constant and all the relevant variables grow at constant rates. To this 
end, let ݃௓ denote the growth rate of a generic variable ܼ. Using equations (2) and (5), we can 
write the aggregate output of the final consumption good ܱሺݐሻ as 
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ܱሺݐሻ ൌ ଵଵିఉ ቄ׬ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻଵିఉ
ଵ
଴ ݀ߥቅ ܴఉ ൌ ொ
ሺ௧ሻோ
ଵିఉ ,   (12) 
 
where ܳሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ݀ߥଵ଴  is the average total quality of the machines that are in use. Similarly, 
we can also express the total spending on machines ܺሺݐሻ as  
ܺሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ߰ݍሺߥ, ݐሻݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ݀ߥ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܳሺݐሻܴ,ଵ଴     (13) 
where ܳሺݐሻ is as stated right after equation (12). Inspecting equations (12) and (13) we see that 
both output ܱሺݐሻ and expenditure on machines ܺሺݐሻ are proportional to average total quality 
ܳሺݐሻ. From this, we infer that ݃ை ൌ ݃௑ ൌ ݃ொ.  
 We now want to show that the mathematical expression in the last line of the preceding 
paragraph implies that consumption ܥሺݐሻ and R&D expenditures ܫሺݐሻ also have to grow at this 
same rate. To see this, first rewrite the creative region’s aggregate resource constraint given in 
equation (1) as  
 
ܥሺݐሻ ൅ ܫሺݐሻ ൌ ܱሺݐሻ െ ܺሺݐሻ ൌ ఉሺଶିఉሻொሺ௧ሻோଵିఉ .     (14) 
 
Next, we differentiate equation (14) with respect to time, remembering that on the BGP, both ݃஼ 
and ݃ூ are constant. After some steps of algebra, we get  
 
݃ை ൌ ݃஼ ൅ ሺ݃ூ െ ݃஼ሻ ቄ ூሺ௧ሻ஼ሺ௧ሻାூሺ௧ሻቅ.     (15) 
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Recall that ݃ை, ݃஼, and ݃ூ are all constant on the BGP. This fact and the fact that equation (15) 
holds for all time ݐ tell us that the ratio ܫሺݐሻ ሼܥሺݐሻ ൅ ܫሺݐሻሽ⁄  is also constant along the BGP. From 
this, it is clear that ܥሺݐሻ and ܫሺݐሻ both grow at the same rate and hence we have  
݃஻ீ௉ ൌ ݃ை ൌ ݃஼ ൌ ݃ூ ൌ ݃ொ.     (16) 
 By maximizing the representative creative class household’s CRRA utility function with 
respect to consumption ܥሺݐሻ, we obtain the standard Euler equation. This equation tells us that 
whenever consumption grows at a constant rate, the interest rate ݎ has to be constant. Adapting 
equation (18) in Acemoglu and Cao (2015, p. 264) to our problem, the transversality condition is 
݈݅݉௧→ஶሼexp	ሺെ׬ ݎሺݏሻ݀ݏሻ௧଴ ׬ ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻሽ ൌ 0.
ଵ
଴  In addition, using our analysis thus far in this 
section and modifying equation (4), we can express aggregate R&D expenditures ܫሺݐሻ as  
ܫሺݐሻ ൌ ሼ݅ா∗ሺݐሻ ൅ ݅஼ሺݐሻሽܳሺݐሻ.     (17) 
We know that both ܫሺݐሻ and ܳሺݐሻ are growing at the same rate. This tells us that the sum 
ሼ݅ா∗ሺݐሻ ൅ ݅஼ሺݐሻሽ is constant.  
 Next, let us show that the R&D expenditures incurred by the existing and the candidate 
entrepreneurs, that is, ݅ா∗ሺݐሻ and ݅஼, are both constant. From the free entry condition for the 
candidate entrepreneurs given in equation (9), we infer that  
ߟሼ݅஼ሺݐሻሽܸሺߥ, ݐ; ߯ݍሻ ൌ ߟሼ݅஼ሺݐሻሽ߱ሺݐሻ߯ݍ ൌ ݍ.   (18) 
Dividing the RHS of equation (18) by quality ݍ gives us 
ߟሼ݅஼ሺݐሻሽ߱ሺݐሻ߯ ൌ 1.       (19) 
Combining equation (19) with the optimality condition in equation (11) for the existing 
entrepreneurs, we get  
ߟሼ݅஼ሺݐሻሽ߱ሺݐሻ߯ ൌ ߶ᇱ൫݅ா∗ሺݐሻ൯ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߱ሺݐሻ.    (20) 
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We now want to determine the sign of the partial derivative ߲݅஼ሺݐሻ ߲݅ா∗ሺݐሻ.⁄  To do so, we 
implicitly differentiate both sides of equation (20) and then simplify the resulting expression. 
This gives us 
 
డ௜಴ሺ௧ሻ
డ௜ಶ∗ሺ௧ሻ ൌ
ሺఋିଵሻథᇱᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሺ௧ሻሻ
ఞఎᇲሼ௜಴ሺ௧ሻሽ ൐ 0,      (21) 
 
because ߶ᇱᇱሺ∙ሻ ൏ 0 and ߟᇱሼ∙ሽ ൏ 0. The sign of the derivative in (21) tells us that R&D spending 
increases by existing entrepreneurs are matched by an increase in R&D spending by the 
candidate entrepreneurs. We have already noted that on the BGP, the sum of R&D expenditures 
݅ா∗ሺݐሻ ൅ ݅஼ሺݐሻ has to be constant. Combining this observation with the sign result in (21), we 
infer that both ݅ா∗ሺݐሻ and ݅஼ሺݐሻ have to be constant. Therefore, we can now dispense with the 
time dependence of these two R&D expenditures and simply write ݅ா∗ሺݐሻ ൌ ݅ா∗ and ݅஼ሺݐሻ ൌ ݅஼. 
The constancy of these two R&D expenditures along with equation (19) tells us that ߱ሺݐሻ ൌ ߱. 
In turn, this means that the value function ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ ൌ ߱ሺݐሻݍ ൌ ߱ݍ. In other words, this value 
function depends only on quality ݍ and not on time ݐ.  
 To find a closed-form expression for ߱, let us use the constancy of ݅ா∗ and ݅஼ and write 
the HJB equation---equation (7)---as the following differential equation  
ݎ஻ீ௉߱ሺݐሻݍ െ ሶ߱ ሺݐሻݍ ൌ ߚݍܴ െ ݅ா∗ݍ ൅ ߱ሺݐሻݍሾሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ െ ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽሿ.   (22) 
Setting ሶ߱ ሺݐሻ ൌ 0 and then simplifying the resulting expression for ߱ሺݐሻ, we get 
 
߱ሺݐሻ ൌ ߱ ൌ ఉோି௜ಶ∗௥ಳಸುିሺఋିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻା௜಴ఎሼ௜಴ሽ.    (23) 
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In equation (23), ߱ is constant because the ratio on the RHS is made up of terms that are 
themselves all constant.  
 Having obtained a closed-form expression for ߱, we are finally in a position to explicitly 
specify the properties of the BGP equilibrium that we have been analyzing in this section. 
Specifically, the BGP equilibrium of interest is described by a system of five equations. These 
are given by (23),  
 
݃஻ீ௉ ൌ ஼ሶሺ௧ሻ஼ሺ௧ሻ ൌ
௥ಳಸುషഐ
ఏ ,      (24) 
ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߱߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൌ 1,      (25) 
߯߱ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ 1,        (26) 
and 
 
݃஻ீ௉ ൌ ொሶ ሺ௧ሻொሺ௧ሻ ൌ ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൅ ሺ߯ െ 1ሻ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽ.    (27) 
 
The expressions in (25) and (26) have been written as equalities because ݅ா∗ ൐ 0 and ݅஼ ൐ 0 in 
the BGP equilibrium that we are studying.  
Equations (23)-(27) constitute a system of five equations in the five unknowns 
݅ா∗, ݅஼, ߱, ݎ஻ீ௉, and ݃஻ீ௉. Therefore, as long as the transversality condition---see the paragraph 
after equation (16)---is satisfied, there exists a BGP equilibrium with the following three 
properties. First, the output of the final consumption good ሺܱሻ, consumption by the 
representative creative class household ሺܥሻ, total R&D expenditures ሺܫሻ, and the average total 
quality of machines ሺܳሻ all grow at a constant rate. Second, our supposition that the value 
function has the form ܸሺݍሻ ൌ ߱ݍ is valid. Finally, R&D expenditures by the existing and the 
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candidate entrepreneurs	ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼) are positive constants. We now proceed to show that this BGP 
equilibrium is unique.  
3.2. Uniqueness 
 We begin by reiterating the point that on the BGP under study, ݅ா∗ ൐ 0 and ݅஼ ൐ 0. This 
follows not only from equations (11) and (19) but also from the Inada like conditions satisfied by 
the ߶ሺ∙ሻ and the ߟሼ∙ሽ functions and described in section 2.2. Using equations (25) and (26), we 
get 
 
ሺఋିଵሻథᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ఞఎሼ௜಴ሽ ൌ 1.       (28) 
 
From the equation (16) result that ݃஼ ൌ ݃ொ on the BGP and equation (27), we get ݎ஻ீ௉ ൌ
ߠሺ߯ െ 1ሻ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൅ ߠሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൅ ߩ. Substituting this last result and equation (25) into 
equation (23) gives us 
 
ሺఋିଵሻሺఉோି௜ಶ∗ሻథᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ሺఋିଵሻሺఏିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻାሼఏሺఞିଵሻାଵሽ௜಴ఎ൛௜಴ൟାఘ ൌ 1.    (29) 
 
Equations (28) and (29) constitute a system of two equations in the variables ݅ா∗ and ݅஼. 
Solving these two equations simultaneously for ݅ா∗ and ݅஼, we can determine ݃஻ீ௉, ݎ஻ீ௉, and ߱ 
from the other equations in the system of equations given by (23)-(27). Now, observe that 
equation (28) leads to the result in (21). This last finding tells us that we can define a function 
݂ሺ∙ሻ where  
݅஼ ൌ ݂ሺ݅ா∗ሻ       (30) 
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and ݂′ሺ∙ሻ ൐ 0. In addition and as described in section 2.2, both the ߶ሺ∙ሻ and the ߟሼ∙ሽ functions 
satisfy Inada like conditions. Therefore, we get ݈݅݉௜ಶ∗→଴݂ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൌ 0 and ݈݅݉௜ಶ∗→ஶ݂ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൌ ∞.  
 We now want to ascertain the sign of the derivative ݀݅஼ ݀݅ா∗.⁄  To determine this sign, let 
us totally differentiate equation (29) and then simplify the resulting expression. After several 
steps of algebra, we get 
 
ௗ௜಴
ௗ௜ಶ∗ ൌ
ሺఋିଵሻሼ൫ఉோି௜ಶ∗൯థᇱᇱ൫௜ಶ∗൯ିఏథᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ሼఏሺఞିଵሻାଵሽሾௗሺఎ൛௜಴ൟ௜಴ሻ ௗ௜಴⁄ ሿ ൏ 0.    (31) 
 
The negative sign in (31) follows from the following two observations. First, the function ߶ሺ∙ሻ is 
strictly concave and hence ߶ᇱᇱሺ∙ሻ ൏ 0. Second, the product ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽ is assumed to be increasing in 
݅஼. Given the strict inequality in (31), we infer that equation (29) implicitly defines a second 
function ݆ሺ∙ሻ where 
݅஼ ൌ ݆ሺ݅ா∗ሻ       (32) 
and ݆ᇱሺ∙ሻ ൏ 0.	 Also, because the ߶ሺ∙ሻ and the ߟሼ∙ሽ functions satisfy the Inada like conditions 
discussed in section 2.2, we have ݈݅݉௜ಶ∗→଴݆ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൌ ݆ሺ0ሻ ൐ 0. The differentiability of the ݂ሺ∙ሻ 
and the ݆ሺ∙ሻ functions tells us that both these functions are continuous. In turn, the continuity of 
these two functions implies that there must exist a unique value of ݅஼ or the R&D expenditures 
incurred by the candidate entrepreneurs with the property that  
݅஼ ൌ ݂ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൌ ݆ሺ݅ா∗ሻ.      (33) 
From equation (33) it is clear that in the BGP equilibrium under study, ݅ா∗ and ݅஼ or the 
R&D expenditures of the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs are uniquely determined. In 
addition, we deduce that the interest rate ሺݎ஻ீ௉ሻ, the creative economy’s growth rate ሺ݃஻ீ௉ሻ, and 
the coefficient of the value function ሺ߱ሻ are all uniquely determined. Therefore, we conclude 
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that the BGP equilibrium that we have been studying in this section is unique. Our next task is to 
examine whether it is possible for this BGP equilibrium to involve different levels of R&D 
expenditures by existing entrepreneurs with machines of dissimilar qualities. 
4. R&D Expenditures by the Existing Entrepreneurs 
 The first point to note is that the optimal level of R&D expenditures by the existing 
entrepreneurs ሺ݅ா∗ሻ is given by equation (11). Inspecting equation (11), it is clear that ݅ா∗ is a 
function of ߜ and ߱ but it is not a function of quality ሺݍሻ. In addition, we know from the section 
3 analysis that in the BGP equilibrium, the value function is linear and given by ܸሺݍሻ ൌ ߱ݍ. 
These two findings together tell us that the optimal R&D expenditures of the existing 
entrepreneurs are independent of ݍ. Therefore, the simple conclusion we now draw is that in the 
BGP equilibrium under study here, it is not possible for the optimal R&D expenditures of the 
existing entrepreneurs to vary across machines with different qualities.  
Having said this, we should also point out that we have thus far studied a BGP 
equilibrium in which the value function ܸሺ∙ሻ is linear. We have not demonstrated that a BGP 
equilibrium in which the value function is nonlinear does not exist. If such an equilibrium were 
to exist then we conjecture that in this equilibrium, the independence result stated in the 
preceding paragraph would not hold. Let us now analyze how the BGP equilibrium discussed in 
section 3 would be altered when the flow rate of innovation function for the existing 
entrepreneurs or ߶ሺ∙ሻ is constant.  
5. The Constancy of the Flow Rate of Innovation  
 When the flow rate of innovation function is constant, we get ߶ᇱሺ∙ሻ ൌ 0. Substituing this 
result in either equation (8) or (10), we see that the maximization problem faced by the existing 
entrepreneurs is linear in their optimal R&D spending choice or ݅ா∗. This means that in the BGP 
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equilibrium, the value function ܸሺ∙ሻ will need to have the property that the existing entrepreneurs 
are indifferent between all possible choices of optimal R&D spending or ݅ா∗. When this is the 
case, all the existing entrepreneurs will typically not select the same optimal R&D expenditure 
݅ா∗. Our last task in this paper is to analyze the effect that taxes and subsidies on R&D by the 
existing and the candidate entrepreneurs have on R&D expenditures and economic growth in the 
creative region under study.  
6. The Impact of R&D Taxes and Subsidies 
6.1. BGP equilibrium with taxes 
 Suppose that an appropriate regional authority (RA) levies taxes on the R&D 
expenditures undertaken by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs. Let us denote these two 
taxes by ߬ா and ߬஼ respectively. Clearly, these two taxes can be expected to alter the R&D 
spending decisions of the two types of entrepreneurs in our creative region. With the tax ߬ா, 
equation (11) for the existing entrepreneurs needs to be modified. We now have  
ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሻ߱ሺݐሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬ா.	     (34) 
Similarly, modifying equation (19) for the candidate entrepreneurs, we get 
ߟሼ݅஼ሺݐሻሽ߱ሺݐሻ߯ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬஼.	      (35) 
Equations (34) and (35) reflect the fact that spending one unit of the final consumption good on 
R&D costs 1 ൅ ߬ா units to the existing entrepreneurs and 1 ൅ ߬஼ units to the candidate 
entrepreneurs.  
 To determine the coefficient ߱ሺݐሻ of the value function, we have to modify equation (22). 
This gives us 
ݎ஻ீ௉߱ሺݐሻ ൌ ߚܴ െ ݅ா∗ሺ1 ൅ ߬ாሻ ൅ ߱ሺݐሻሾሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ െ ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽሿ.	  (36) 
Simplifying equation (36), we get the equation for ߱ሺݐሻ that we seek. That equation is 
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߱ሺݐሻ ൌ ߱ ൌ ఉோି௜ಶ∗ሺଵାఛಶሻ௥ಳಸುିሺఋିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻା௜಴ఎሼ௜಴ሽ.	    (37) 
 
Equation (37) tells us that although ߱ does not depend on the tax on candidate entrepreneurs 
ሺ߬஼ሻ, it does depend directly on the tax on existing entrepreneurs ሺ߬ாሻ. 
 The BGP equilibrium with the R&D taxes will now be determined by a system of 
equations similar to equations (23)-(27). Using modified versions of equations (28) and (29), we 
can, once again, solve for the optimal values of ݅ா∗ and ݅஼. The two modified equations are 
 
ቀଵାఛ಴ଵାఛಶቁ
ሺఋିଵሻథᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ఞఎሼ௜಴ሽ ൌ 1	      (38) 
 
and 
 
ሺఋିଵሻሼఉோି௜ಶ∗൫ଵାఛಶ൯ሽథᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ሺఋିଵሻሺఏିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻାሼఏሺఞିଵሻାଵሽ௜಴ఎ൛௜಴ൟାఘ ൌ 1.	    (39) 
 
Once equations (38) and (39) have been solved simultaneously for the optimal values of ݅ா∗ and 
݅஼, we can ascertain the BGP growth rate of our creative region’s economy from the 
representative creative class household’s Euler equation and the definition of the growth rate 
given in equation (27). Using the same line of reasoning as that employed in section 3.2 to obtain 
equations (30) and (32), we infer that with the two taxes in place, equation (38) defines a strictly 
increasing and differentiable function ݂ሺ∙ሻ where  
݅஼ ൌ ݂ሺ݅ா∗, ߬ா, ߬஼ሻ.       (40) 
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Similarly, equation (39) defines a strictly decreasing and differentiable function ݆ሺ∙ሻ where 
݅஼ ൌ ݆ሺ݅ா∗, ߬ாሻ.       (41) 
Because differentiability implies continuity, the ݂ሺ∙ሻ and the ݆ሺ∙ሻ functions are continuous and 
this tells us that for any tax policy ሺ߬ா, ߬஼ሻ implemented by the RA in our creative region, there 
will exist a unique BGP equilibrium with taxes. 
6.2. Comparative statics with taxes and subsidies 
6.2.1 Tax/subsidy on candidate entrepreneurs 
 Suppose there is an increase in the R&D tax levied on candidate entrepreneurs ሺ߬஼ሻ. One 
way to interpret this tax on the candidate entrepreneurs is to think of it as a policy that is, in 
effect, a more stringent patent policy than the patent policy that existed before this increase in ߬஼. 
Since the function ݆ሺ݅ா∗, ߬ாሻ in equation (41) does not depend on ߬஼, the graph of this function is 
unaffected by this increase. However, the function ݂ሺ∙ሻ in equation (40) depends on both ߬ா and 
߬஼. Now, implicit differentiation of equation (38), keeping the R&D spending by the candidate 
entrepreneurs ݅஼ fixed, yields 
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛ಴ ௜಴	௙௜௫௘ௗ ൌ െ
థᇲ൫௜ಶ∗൯
൫ଵାఛ಴൯థᇲᇲሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ ൐ 0.     (42) 
 
Equation (42) tells us that the graph of the function ݂ሺ∙, ߬ா, ߬஼ሻ shifts to the right. Combining this 
discussion about how an increase in ߬஼ affects the graph of the two relevant functions, we see 
that 
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛ಴ ൐ 0	ܽ݊݀	
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛ಴ ൏ 0.      (43) 
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In other words, an increase in the tax on R&D spending incurred by the candidate entrepreneurs 
lowers their R&D and increases the R&D undertaken by the existing entrepreneurs. Alternately, 
when this R&D tax increase is viewed as a more stringent patent policy, this more stringent 
patent policy lowers (increases) the R&D undertaken by the candidate (existing) entrepreneurs. 
Now note that if ߬஼ is the tax imposed on the R&D spending of the candidate 
entrepreneurs then we can interpret െ߬஼ as the corresponding subsidy given to these same 
entrepreneurs. This means that a small increase in the tax ߬஼ is equivalent to a small decrease in 
the subsidy െ߬஼. So, looked at from the standpoint of a subsidy, the comparative statics results in 
(43) tell us that an increase in the subsidy െ߬஼ on R&D spending undertaken by the candidate 
entrepreneurs raises their R&D and lowers the R&D taken on by the existing entrepreneurs. 
 What is the impact of the increase in ߬஼ on the BGP growth rate of the economy of our 
creative region? To answer this question, we differentiate equation (27). This gives 
 
ௗ௚ಳಸು
ௗఛ಴ ൌ ሺ߯ െ 1ሻ
డሾ௜಴ఎ൛௜಴ൟሿ
డ௜಴ ሺ
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛ಴ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
ሻ ൅	ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶′ሺ݅ா∗ሻሺௗ௜ಶ∗ௗఛ಴ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
ሻ ≷ 0.  (44) 
 
The sign of the first term on the RHS of equation (44) is negative because this first term records 
the contribution to economic growth made by the candidate entrepreneurs and this contribution is 
lessened with the tax ሺ߬஼ሻ. In contrast, the sign of the second term on the RHS is positive 
because this second term accounts for the contribution to economic growth made by the existing 
entrepreneurs and this contribution is increased with the tax ሺ߬஼ሻ. Putting these two pieces of 
information together, we see that the total effect of the R&D tax (or subsidy) on the BGP growth 
rate is ambiguous.  
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6.2.2 Tax/subsidy on existing entrepreneurs 
 We now study the impacts of the R&D tax on the existing entrepreneurs in our creative 
region. Note that equations (38) and (39) are both affected by the tax ሺ߬ாሻ. Differentiating both 
sides of equation (38) and then simplifying the resulting expression gives us 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛಶ ௜಴	௙௜௫௘ௗ ൌ
థᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ
ሺଵାఛಶሻథᇱᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ ൏ 0.     (45) 
 
So, for a fixed level of R&D spending by the candidate entrepreneurs, the existing entrepreneurs 
respond to the tax ߬ா by lowering their R&D spending. This means that the graph of the upward 
sloping ݂ሺ∙ሻ function shifts to the left. Next, we totally differentiate both sides of equation (39). 
This gives us  
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛಶ ௜಴	௙௜௫௘ௗ ൌ
ሺఋିଵሻ௜ಶ∗థᇲ൫௜ಶ∗൯ାଵ
ങ
ങ೔ಶ∗൤
ሺഃషభሻ൛ഁೃష೔ಶ∗൫భశഓಶ൯ൟഝᇲ൫೔ಶ∗൯
౴൫೔ಶ∗,೔಴൯ ൨
Δሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼ሻ,    (46) 
 
where the function Δሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼ሻ ൌ ሺߜ െ 1ሻሺߠ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൅ ሼ1 ൅ ߠሺ߯ െ 1ሻሽ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൅ ߩ.  
Recall from the discussion in section 6.1 that the ݆ሺ∙, ߬ாሻ function is strictly decreasing. 
Knowing this, we infer that the sign of the derivative డሾ∙ሿడ௜ಶ∗ in the denominator on the RHS of 
equation (46) is negative. Given this last finding, equation (39) tells us that for a given level of 
R&D spending by the candidate entrepreneurs ሺ݅஼ሻ, R&D spending by the existing entrepreneurs 
ሺ݅ா∗ሻ is decreasing in the R&D tax ሺ߬ாሻ levied on the existing entrepreneurs. In symbols, we 
have ௗ௜
ಶ∗
ௗఛಶ ௜಴	௙௜௫௘ௗ ൏ 0. Put differently, the graph of the strictly decreasing function ݆ሺ∙, ߬
ாሻ shifts 
to the left. The discussion thus far tells us that the total impact of the tax ߬ா on the R&D 
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spending of the candidate entrepreneurs is indeterminate. Therefore, the result that is analogous 
to (43) in section 6.2.1 is  
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛಶ ൏ 0	ܽ݊݀	
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛಶ ≷ 0.      (47) 
It is informative to comprehend why the impact of the tax ߬ா on R&D spending by the 
candidate entrepreneurs is indeterminate. Consider a given level of ݅஼. Then, equation (27) tells 
us that lower R&D spending by the existing entrepreneurs will reduce the growth rate of the 
economy of our creative region. When this happens, the representative creative class household’s 
Euler equation says that the interest rate will also fall. This falling interest rate will make 
innovations now more appealing to entrepreneurs because of the reduced discounting of future 
profits. As such, this first effect tends to increase the R&D spending ሺ݅஼ሻ of the candidate 
entrepreneurs. However, recall that the point of the Schumpeterian competition between the 
existing and the candidate entrepreneurs is to enable a candidate entrepreneur to “jump over” or 
creatively destroy an existing entrepreneur and take this individual’s place as the producer of a 
machine that is used to produce the final consumption good. In this regard, the tax ߬ா diminishes 
the value of becoming an existing entrepreneur. This second effect tends to decrease R&D 
expenditures by the candidate entrepreneurs. Because these two effects go in opposite directions, 
the total impact of the tax ߬ா on R&D spending by the candidate entrepreneurs is indeterminate. 
 As in section 6.2.1, when ߬ா is the tax imposed on the R&D spending of existing 
entrepreneurs, we can interpret െ߬ா as the corresponding subsidy given to these same 
entrepreneurs. In other words, a small increase in the tax ߬ா is equivalent to a small decrease in 
the subsidy െ߬ா. So, looked at from the perspective of a subsidy, the comparative statics results 
in (47) imply that an increase in the subsidy െ߬ா on R&D spending undertaken by existing 
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entrepreneurs raises their R&D and has an ambiguous impact on the R&D undertaken by the 
candidate entrepreneurs. 
 Consistent with the analysis in section 6.2.1, we can again ask what the impact of the 
increase in ߬ா is on the BGP growth rate of the economy of our creative region. In symbols, we 
want to know the sign of the derivative ݀݃஻ீ௉ ݀߬ா⁄ . We claim that an increase in the tax on the 
R&D of existing entrepreneurs lowers the growth rate of the economy of our creative region or 
݀݃஻ீ௉ ݀߬ா⁄ ൏ 0. To demonstrate the validity of our claim, we proceed with a proof by 
contradiction. We begin by focusing on equation (37) which specifies the coefficient ߱ of the 
value function ܸሺ∙ሻ. Inspection of equation (37) shows that, inter alia, ߱ depends on the 
exogenous tax ߬ா and on the three endogenous variables ݅ா∗, ݅஼, and ݎ஻ீ௉. Now, if we use the 
representative creative class household’s Euler equation to substitute the value of the BGP 
growth rate ݃஻ீ௉ for the BGP interest rate ݎ஻ீ௉ in equation (37), we get 
 
߱ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼, ݃஻ீ௉;	߬ாሻ ൌ ఉோି௜
ಶ∗ሺଵାఛಶሻ
ఏ௚ಳಸುାఘିሺఋିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻା௜಴ఎሼ௜಴ሽ.	    (48) 
 
To make further progress, we will need to totally differentiate equation (48). This gives us the 
following derivative  
 
ௗఠሺ௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು;	ఛಶሻ
ௗఛಶ ൌ
డఠ
డఛಶ ൅
డఠ
డ௜ಶ∗
డ௜ಶ∗
డఛಶ ൅
డఠ
డ௜಴
డ௜಴
డఛಶ ൅
డఠ
డ௚ಳಸು
డ௚ಳಸು
డఛಶ .   (49) 
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We can immediately simplify two of the partial derivatives in equation (49). Specifically, from 
equation (48) we get ߲߱ ߲߬ா⁄ ൏ 0. Also, the envelope theorem11 tells us that ߲߱ ߲݅ா∗⁄ ൌ 0.  
 To continue the proof, suppose our claim that ݀݃஻ீ௉ ݀߬ா⁄ ൏ 0 is false and that 
݀݃஻ீ௉ ݀߬ா⁄ ൐ 0. Keeping equation (27) and the result that ߲݅ா∗ ߲߬ா ൏ 0⁄  from (47) in mind, we 
reason that the BGP growth rate ݃஻ீ௉ can only increase if the candidate entrepreneurs respond to 
the tax ߬ா by substantially increasing their R&D spending ݅஼. In symbols, we need to have 
 
డ௚ಳಸು
డఛಶ ൐ 0	 ⇒ 	
డ௜಴
డఛಶ ൐ 0.      (50) 
 
Because the product ݅஼ߟሼ݅஼ሽ is assumed to be increasing in ݅஼, from equation (48) we infer that 
߲߱ ߲݃஻ீ௉⁄ ൏ 0 and that ߲߱ ߲݅஼ ൏ 0.⁄  As such, equations (49) and (50) together tell us that if 
݃஻ீ௉ is to go up then the following result must hold 
 
ௗఠሺ௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು;	ఛಶሻ
ௗఛಶ ൌ
డఠ
డఛಶด
ି
൅ డఠడ௜಴ด
ି
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛಶด
ା
൅ డఠడ௚ಳಸುᇣᇤᇥ
ି
ௗ௚ಳಸು
ௗఛಶᇣᇤᇥ
ା
൏ 0.   (51) 
 
 Next, we rewrite equation (35) which tells us how the candidate entrepreneurs set their 
R&D spending. This gives us  
߯߱ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼, ݃஻ீ௉;	߬ாሻߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬஼.    (52) 
Totally differentiating equation (52), we get  
 
                                                            
11  
See theorem A.31 in Acemoglu (2009, pp. 914-915) for additional details on the envelope theorem. 
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߯ߟᇱሼ݅஼ሽ߱ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼, ݃஻ீ௉;	߬ாሻ ௗ௜
಴
ௗఛಶ ൅ ߯ߟሼ݅஼ሽ
ௗఠሺ௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು;	ఛಶሻ
ௗఛಶ ൌ 0.   (53) 
 
Because ߟᇱሼ݅஼ሽ ൏ 0, we can use this result to rewrite equation (53) in a more convenient form. 
That form is 
 
ௗఠሺ௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು;	ఛಶሻ ௗఛಶ⁄
ௗ௜಴ ௗఛಶ⁄ ൌ െ
ఠ൫௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು;	ఛಶ൯ఎᇲሼ௜಴ሽ
ఎ൛௜಴ൟ ൐ 0.   (54) 
 
However, equation (54) clearly contradicts the result, from equations (50) and (51), that  
 
ௗఠሺ௜ಶ∗,௜಴,௚ಳಸು,	ఛಶ ௗఛಶ⁄
ௗ௜಴ ௗఛಶ⁄ ൌ
డఠ డఛಶ⁄
ௗ௜಴ ௗఛಶ⁄ᇣᇤᇥ
ሺିሻ
൅ డఠడఛಶด
ሺିሻ
൅ ሺడఠ డ௚ಳಸು⁄ௗ௜಴ ௗఛಶ⁄ ሻሺᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ሺିሻ
ௗ௚ಳಸು ௗఛಶ⁄
ௗ௜಴ ௗఛಶ⁄ ሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ሺାሻ
൏ 0.  (55) 
 
Therefore, we conclude that ݀݃஻ீ௉ ݀߬ா⁄ ൏ 0.  
 To intuitively see why the growth rate of the economy of our creative region cannot 
increase with the tax ߬ா, note that when the existing entrepreneurs reduce their spending on 
R&D, higher economic growth can come about only if there is increased R&D by the candidate 
entrepreneurs. However, candidate entrepreneurs will increase their spending on R&D if and 
only if as a result of this increase, the future value of being an existing entrepreneur rises. This is 
what equation (54) tells us. In symbols, ݅஼ will go up only if ߱ also goes up.  
Now suppose that the equilibrium value function (proxied by ߱ሻ goes up. Then, from the 
standpoint of the existing entrepreneurs, in equilibrium, a higher value function can exist 
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simultaneously with higher growth and replacement rates12 only if their economic rewards are 
also higher. However, higher taxes do not raise but instead lower the economic rewards accruing 
to existing entrepreneurs. Put differently, in the presence of the tax ߬ா, an increase in the R&D 
spending of the candidate entrepreneurs is not sufficient for the growth rate of the creative region 
to rise.  
From the perspective of the RA, the finding in the preceding paragraph points to a clear 
asymmetry in the growth effects of innovation policy. In particular, a tax on the R&D of the 
candidate entrepreneurs may or may not stimulate the growth rate of the economy of the creative 
region. However, a tax on the R&D undertaken by the existing entrepreneurs will definitely 
lower this same growth rate. This concludes our analysis of Schumpeterian creative class 
competition, innovation policy, and regional economic growth.  
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we concentrated on a region that was creative in the sense of Richard 
Florida. Broadly speaking, the creative class was composed of existing and candidate 
entrepreneurs. The general question we analyzed concerned the impacts of Schumpeterian 
competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs for economic growth and innovation 
policy in the region under study. We performed four specific tasks. First, when the flow rate of 
innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs was strictly concave, we described the 
circumstances in which competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs led to a 
unique balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Second, we examined whether it was possible 
for the BGP equilibrium to involve different levels of R&D expenditures by the existing 
                                                            
12  
This replacement refers to the replacement of existing entrepreneurs by candidate entrepreneurs as a result of the Schumpeterian 
competition between them. Alternately, we can also think of this replacement as an outcome of the creative destruction of lower 
quality machines by higher quality ones.  
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entrepreneurs. Third, we showed how the BGP equilibrium was altered when the flow rate of 
innovation function for the existing entrepreneurs was constant. Finally, we studied the impact 
that taxes and subsidies on R&D by existing and candidate entrepreneurs had on R&D 
expenditures and on regional economic growth.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
two suggestions for augmenting the research described here. First, suppose that the ߟሼ∙ሽ function 
that was assumed to be strictly decreasing and differentiable in the present paper is not strictly 
decreasing but constant so that we have ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ̂ߟ, a constant. This means that there are no 
externalities in the economy emanating from the R&D undertaken by the candidate 
entrepreneurs. It would be interesting to analyze the effects of the R&D taxes and subsidies in 
this particular case. Second, it would also be useful to analyze a multi-region model of 
Schumpeterian competition between the creative classes in different regions to ascertain what 
kinds of spatial interactions between different creative regions can be studied in a theoretically 
meaningful manner. Studies that incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will 
increase our understanding of the nexuses between Schumpeterian competition in the creative 
class in one or more regions and economic growth in these same regions.  
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